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We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where
payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does
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1. introduction
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set.
Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve
prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack
game. The buyer’s problem is to procure a subset of maximal quality. We
study a procurement auction that can be viewed as a game-theoretic ex-
tension of the greedy-split heuristic for the classic knapsack problem. The
auction exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies, is ex-post rational, and
satisfies the hard budget constraint. We see many applications for this
procurement setting, e.g., allocating R&D subidies, scholarships, emission
reductions.
Despite its relevance, the problem has received surprisingly little attention
in the literature. We introduced the auction in Ensthaler and Giebe (2009).
In independent research, approaching the problem from a different angle,
Papadimitriou and Singer (2010) analyze a similar direct mechanism in a
more general framework. The allocation problem was first studied by Giebe
et al. (2006) in the context of R&D subsidies. Chung and Ely (2002) (ex-
tending the work of Maskin, 2002) derive the optimal Bayesian mechanism
for a similar procurement problem under a soft budget constraint.
2. the model
Let I := {1, . . . , N}, N ≥ 1, denote the set of sellers where i is a typical
seller. Each seller wants to sell an indivisible item for which he has a pri-
vately known reserve price θi. Items differ in quality and quality is common
knowledge. Let wi > 0 denote the quality of seller i’s item. Sellers are faced
by a single buyer who has a fixed and finite budget B to spend on these
items. The buyer’s objective is to purchase a subset of items of maximal
quality, where the quality of a set of items is the sum of qualities of its
elements. Money does not enter the buyer’s utility function. Sellers’ types
satisfy θi ∈ [0,B]. We assume that the probability of two types being equal
is zero and that there is no known statistical relation between sellers’ types,
resp. between quality and types.
In the following, a mechanism is an open auction or a direct mechanism. We
restrict attention to symmetric deterministic mechanisms, where the sellers
submit bids bi ≥ 0 (or type reports bi ∈ [0,B]). The vector of sellers’ bids
(reports) is b = (bi, b−i) = (b1, . . . , bN ) where a truthful report is bi = θi.
For given bids, b, and true type θi, seller i’s ex-post utility is
ui(b|θi) := ti(b)− qi(b)θi, (1)
where ti is a payment to i and qi ∈ {0, 1}. Let A(b) := {i ∈ I|qi(b) = 1}
denote the allocation resulting from the play of a mechanism when the vector
of final bids (type reports) is b, and denote the complementary set by Ac.
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The allocation is the set of sellers whose objects are procured. For simplicity,
denote ui(b) := ui(b|θi) and A := A(b) if confusion is unlikely.
The buyer’s utility is the total quality of the procured items,
ubuyer(A) =
∑
j∈A
wj =
∑
i∈I
qiwi, qi ∈ {0, 1}. (2)
Under complete information, the buyer faces a simple knapsack problem,
argmax
q
∑
i∈I
wiqi s.t.
∑
i∈I
θiqi ≤ B, q ∈ {0, 1}
N . (3)
Call (3) the first-best allocation(s).
3. the auction
Consider the following open descending clock auction. A central continuous
clock counts down the price-per-quality ratio r, beginning from the highest
initial ratio among all bidders, rmax := maxi∈I B/wi. A bidder can quit the
auction at any time, but can never come back. Being active at clock reading
r implies that bidder i is willing to accept a payment of rwi in return for
his item.
As the clock counts down, each active bidder’s current financial bid, rwi,
decreases. As long as the sum of active financial bids exceeds the budget,
the countdown continues. As soon as that sum fits in the budget, say, at
round rf , the auction ends, and each active bidder i sells his item at the
price rfwi.
The sum of active financial bids decreases smoothly as the clock counts
down, until some bidder j exits, at which point that sum is reduced by the
amount rwj .
Two events can end the auction. First, the end can be triggered by an exit,
when before the exit, the sum of active financial bids exceeded the budget,
but after the exit the remaining active bids can be accomodated without
exhausting the budget. Second, it may end because at some point all active
bids exactly use up the budget.
After the auction, each loser j has a final ratio rj = bj/wj with financial
bid bj since j quit the auction at clock reading r = rj . All winners i have
the same final ratio rf = bi/wi with (different) selling prices bi.
Lemma 1. The stop rule bi(θi) = θi is a weakly dominant strategy.
Proof. Suppose a seller plays the candidate. His profit is either zero, if he
has to quit before the auction ends, or it is positive, if the auction ends
before he quits. Consider stopping earlier. Either there is no change or he
quits but could have made a profit. Consider stopping later. Either there is
no change, or he makes a loss if the auction ends after r = θi but before he
quits.
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In order to give a direct characterization of the auctions’ equilibrium result
we need the following notation.
Let li denote the set of players with final ratio not above that of bidder
i. Let rAc denote the smallest ratio among all players who are not in the
allocation (unless Ac = ∅).
li :=
{
j ∈ I
∣∣∣∣∣ bjwj ≤
bi
wi
}
(4)
rAc :=


min
{
bj
wj
∣∣∣ j ∈ Ac} if Ac 6= ∅
B
minj∈I wj
if Ac = ∅
(5)
Lemma 2. In equilibrium (bi = θi), the auction implements allocation A
and payments t where
qi(b) =
{
1 if bi
wi
∑
j∈li
wj ≤ B
0 otherwise,
(6)
ti(b) =


min
{
rAcwi,
B∑
j∈A
wj
wi
}
if qi(b) = 1
0 otherwise.
(7)
Proof. By Lemma 1, winners’ true ratios are below the final ratio, θi/wi <
rf = bi/wi since they were active at the end of the auction. Thus, winners
have lower true ratios than losers. All winners are paid according to the
same ratio, rf , i.e. winner i gets bi = r
fwi. Thus, i is a winner iff it is
feasible to pay every player with same or lower final ratio according to i’s
final ratio, see (6).
Losers receive no payment and keep their items. The payments to the win-
ners i ∈ A depend on which event ends the auction. If the end is triggered
by an exit, then the exiting player’s final ratio determines the payments,
rAcwi, otherwise payments are
B∑
j∈A
wj
wi, i.e., they use up the budget.
The second line in (5) just makes the definition complete but is never payoff-
relevant.
Observation 1. Suppose bi ∈ [0,B] are type reports. Then (6) and (7) de-
fine an incentive-compatible direct mechanism (q, t) with allocation and pay-
ments as in the auction. This mechanism exhibits truthtelling in dominant
strategies, satisfies the hard budget constraint and is ex-post individually
rational.
4. discussion
Obviously, the auction observes the hard budget constraint. It is ex-post
rational since all winners are paid according to a ratio that exceeds their
true ratio and losers pay nothing.
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Apart from these appealing incentive properties, how well does the auction
perform compared to the first-best solution?
For the special case where all items have the same quality, one can easily
show that the auction is a 2-approximation, which means that in every
instance, the first-best allocation is at most twice as good as the allocation
chosen by the auction.
For the general case with different qualities Papadimitriou and Singer (2010)
show that a slightly modified direct mechanism is a 6-approximation.
Though these worst-case bounds may not sound encouraging, simulations
indicate that the average performance of the auction is likely to be much
better.1
Is there a mechanism that is better or optimal (on average)? We see plenty
of room for further research.
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